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STRICKLER v. GREENE: A DEADLY




Over two thousand years ago, Sun-tzu1 wrote that "a
successful mission is based on comprehension prior to action."2
Perhaps no other phrase better describes a criminal defense
attorney's need to fully comprehend the prosecution's case
against the defendant before the start of trial.3 Consequently,
the United States Supreme Court has upheld a criminal
defendant's right to full prosecutorial disclosure of evidence
favorable to the accused.4 According to the Court, evidence
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; BA., cum
laude, New York University.
1 Sun-tzu, whose given name was Sun Wu, served as a Chinese military
strategist during the Fifth Century B.C. See SUN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR, THE NEW
TRANSLATION 15-19 (J.H. Huang trans., Quill 1993). Sun-tzu was "appointed both
to be in charge of troop discipline and also to assist [a Chinese general] ... in
designing [the army's] expansion strategy." Id. at 18. "Sun-tzu is the book's title,
and it also is the author's name; labeling a book after its author was customary in
China...." Id. at 15.
2 Id. at 112.
3 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (stating that a prosecutor
violates the constitutional duty of disclosure if the information withheld from
defense counsel is of such sufficient significance that it denies the defendant's right
to a fair trial).
4 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (remanding for a new trial
because the prosecution's failure to disclose certain evidence to the defense raised "a
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result");
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (recognizing that the withholding
of material evidence from the defense warrants reversal of the conviction if the
suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial"); Agurs, 427 U.S. at
112 (declaring that omitted evidence that "creates a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist" constitutes reversible error); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86
(1963) (holding that the prosecution's failure to disclose an accomplice's confession
to the homicide "was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); see also Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (1987)
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favorable to a criminal defendant must be accorded great
significance because such evidence implicates both Confrontation
Clause5 and Due Process 6 principles. The Court has been careful
to safeguard the criminal defense attorney's right of access to
evidence favorable to the accused because of the potential effects
that the omitted evidence could have on the trial jury.7
Moreover, the Court has been reluctant to take the place of the
jury when faced with determining the potential effects that
undisclosed evidence favorable to a criminal defendant would
have had on jurors during trial.8 In stark contrast to the United
States Supreme Court's usual candor towards the trial jury and
evidence favorable to the criminally accused 9 is the Court's
recent decision in Strickler v. Greene.10
In Strickler, a capital murder case, the Court dealt with a
Virginia prosecutor's failure to disclose documents that would
("The prosecutor's role as an advocate is tempered by an obligation of fairness, a
duty to ensure that each trial results in an accurate determination of guilt and
punishment. At the very core of this duty are the... rules requiring the prosecutor
to disclose evidence favorable to the defense .... .") (footnote omitted).
5 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis the United States Supreme
Court declared that the evidence withheld from defense counsel denied the
defendant the opportunity to "expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the
sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness." Id. at 318. By withholding the evidence in question from
defense counsel, the prosecution accordingly denied the defendant "the right of
effective cross-examination." Id. According to the Court, a "primary interesf'
secured by the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause is "the right of cross-
examination." Id. at 315.
6 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (stating that "the confrontation
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment including the right of cross-examination is to be
enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the
same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
7 See, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. In Davis, the Court characterized the jury as
the "sole triers of fact and credibility" to whom the defendant was entitled to
present his entire defense, free from omissions resulting from undisclosed evidence
favorable to the defendant. Id.; see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)
(noting that a jury's deliberations could often turn on "subtle factors," thereby
entitling jurors to be privy to all the evidence that an accused would want to present
in his defense).
8 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 317 (declaring that the Court will not speculate as to
how the jury would have interpreted the defendant's theory of the case had the
prosecution disclosed the omitted evidence to defense counsel); see also Brady, 373
U.S. at 88 (1963) (stating that the Court is unwilling to put itself in the place of the
jury).
9 See supra notes 4-8.
10 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
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have severely impeached a key prosecution witness.1 The Court
analyzed the effects of the prosecutions non-disclosure of the
documents in light of Brady v. Maryland12 and its progeny.
13
The majority held that the defendant failed to show that there
was "a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence
would have been different had [the documents] been disclosed"14
and aT ed the defendant's death sentence.15  Speaking on
behalf of the Strickler trial jury, the Court asserted, among other
things, that the record provided "strong support for the
conclusion that [the defendant] would have been convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death, even if [the witness in
question] had been severely impeached" at trial.16 The Court
further determined that even if the undisclosed documents had
been made available to defense counsel, causing the witness's
testimony to be "entirely discredited," the Strickler trial jury
"might still have concluded" that death was the proper
punishment.' 7 Justice Souter disagreed with the majority and
penned a vigorous dissent.'8
It is submitted that the Strickler decision is severely flawed.
The United States Supreme Court inexplicably took the place of
the trial jury and unilaterally sentenced the defendant to
death-an act that is denounced by this Comment. It is
essential to note that this Comment does not question the guilt
phase of the Strickler case-the defendant's guilt is conceded.
Rather, this Comment assaults the brazen conclusions reached
by the Court in speculating about the trial jury's deliberations
during Stricklers sentencing phase. Moreover, this Comment
urges that the non-disclosure of the documents in question
cannot constitute harmless error under the standards previously
set forth by the Court. This Comment also attacks the Court's
futile exercise in legal semantics when determining how the
11 See id. at 265.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13 See supra note 4. Collectively, Brady v. Maryland and its progeny are known
as the "Brady doctrine" or the "Brady rule." See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-81; see
also Rosen, supra note 4, at 696.
14 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.
15 See id.
16 Id. at 294.
17 Id. at 292.
18 See id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined in part by
Justice Kennedy. See id.
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undisclosed evidence would have affected the results of the trial
and the jury's sentence recommendation. The Strickler decision
not only jeopardizes the trial jury's status as sole trier of fact,
but also hangs the fate of capital defendants on the whims of
capricious legal terminology.
The intricate facts of Strickler necessitate Part I of this
Comment, which will summarize the crucial details of the case,
as well as the specific findings of the majority. Part II will
present the legal principles that were implicated by the
prosecution's failure to disclose the documents in question. Part
III will argue that the majority erred in affirming the
defendant's death sentence. The United States Supreme Court
cannot predict what the Strickler jury would have recommended
at the sentencing phase had the damaging evidence been
presented by the defense. Part III will also demonstrate how the
Court failed to recognize and acknowledge the constitutional
violations that resulted from the prosecution's failure to disclose
the disputed evidence. Therefore, it will be argued that the
prosecutions failure to turn over the documents cannot be
classified as harmless constitutional error during the sentencing
phase. This Comment will thus agree with Justice Souter's
dissent and assert that, in the interests of justice, the Court
should have ordered a new sentencing phase instead of reaching
conclusions of fact on behalf of the trial jury.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Circumstances of Leanne Whitlock's Murder
Leanne Whitlock was a sophomore at James Madison
University during the winter of 1990.19 At approximately 6:30 or
6:45 p.m. on January 5, Leanne drove to the Valley Shopping
Mall in Harrisonbourg, Virginia so that she could return her
boyfriend's car.20 Leanne never got the chance to "return the car
and was not again seen alive by any of her friends or family."21
19 See Strickler v. Virginia, 404 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Va. 1991).
20 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266-67. Leanne's boyfriend, John Dean, had lent
her his blue 1986 Mercury Lynx. See id. Dean worked at the Valley Shopping Mall.
See id.
21 Id. at 267.
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That same afternoon, Leanne was abducted, raped, robbed, and
murdered.22
Over a week later, on January 13, a local farmer called the
police to advise them that he had found a wallet that might
belong to one of Leanne's murderers. 23 The police proceeded to
search the area where the wallet was recovered: a cornfield
twenty-five miles from the scene of Leanne's abduction.24 The
search led the police "to the discovery of Whitlock's frozen, nude,
and battered body."25 Leanne Whitlock "was found in a nearby
wooded area, 300 feet from the highway, buried under two logs
and covered with leaves which had been deliberately packed
around the logs."2 6 Leanne's body was found with her hands
"extended over her head and crossed at the wrists."27 The police
also found a bloody sixty-nine pound rock nearby.28 Forensic
analysis of the body "indicated that Whitlock's death was caused
by 'multiple blunt force injuries to the head.' "29
Shortly thereafter, the police arrested Thomas David
Strickler 30 and his accomplice. 31  Strickler was eventually
"convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death."3 2 The trial
jury then "recommended death after finding the predicates of
'future dangerousness' and 'vileness' 33 in accordance with
Virginia law.34
22 See id. at 266.
23 See id. at 269.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Strickler v. Virginia, 404 S.E.2d 227, 231 (Va. 1991).
27 Id.
28 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 269.
29 Id. at 267 (citation omitted). In particular, "[Leanne's] death was caused by
four large, crushing, depressed skull fractures with lacerations of the brain."
Strickler, 404 S.E.2d at 231.
30 See Strickler, 404 S.E.2d at 227.
31 Strickler's accomplice was Ronald Henderson. See id. at 230. Henderson was
subsequently "convicted of first-degree murder but acquitted of capital murder."
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 292 n.40.
32 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266.
33 Id. at 295 n.48.
34 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995). The statute states, in
pertinent part:
[A] sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1)
after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he
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B. The Testimony of Anne Stoltzfus, the Prosecution's Star
Witness
Anne Stoltzfus was present during Leanne Whitlock's
abduction at the Valley Shopping Mall.35 Stoltzfus and her
fourteen year-old daughter were shopping in a "Music Land"
store when they first encountered Strickler and his entourage.36
Stoltzfus and her daughter left the store, only to again encounter
the threesome forty-five minutes later.37 The two witnesses
would see them for a third and final time in the parking lot while
Stoltzfus and her daughter were driving to another part of the
mall.38
Stoltzfus testified that, while driving, she and her daughter
"saw [Leanne Whitlock's] shiny dark blue car," which had
"stopped behind a minivan at a stop sign."3 9 At this point,
Strickler rushed out of the mall, into the parking lot area and
began harassing the drivers of a van and a pickup truck before
turning his attention to Leanne's car.40 Upon approaching
Leanne's car, Strickler "'pounded on' the passenger window,
shook the car, yanked the door open and jumped in."41 Strickler
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the
victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed.
Id. The Commonwealth of Virginia was required to prove the death-aggravating
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie
1995).
35 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 270.
36 See id. Stoltzfus referred to Strickler as "Mountain Man" during the course of
her testimony. Id. Strickler was accompanied in the store by his accomplice,
Henderson (whom Stoltzfus referred to as "Shy Guy"), and by a blonde girl. Id. at
270-71. The "blonde girl" was a woman named Donna Kay Tudor. Id. Stoltzfus had
testified to the physical appearances of the threesome "in great detail." Id. at 270
n.5. Strickler had made an impression on Stoltzfus because of his behavior at the
store. See id. at 272-73. Stoltzfus testified that Strickler was "revved up" and "very
impatient." Id. at 271. Strickler's demeanor "frightened" Stoltzfus. Id.
37 See id. Donna Kay Tudor, "Blonde Girl," apparently asked Stoltzfus for
directions to the bus stop. Id.
38 See id.
39 Id. Stoltzfus described the female driver of the blue car as being "beautiful,"
"well dressed," and "happy." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Apparently, Leanne Whitlock was even "singing" as she drove her boyfriend's car.
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
40 See id.
41 Id. According to Stoltzfus, after forcing his way into Leanne's car, Strickler
motioned for the rest of his entourage to get in the car. See id. at 270-71.
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began hitting Leanne as he forced her to drive away.42 Stoltzfus
managed to pull her car "parallel to [Leanne's] blue car... and
leaned over to ask repeatedly if [Leanne] was 'OK.'-43 Stoltzfus
testified that Leanne "looked Trozen' and mouthed an inaudible
response" that Stoltzfus interpreted to be the word "help."44
Leanne, however, slowly drove around Stoltzfus, "went over the
curb with [the] horn honking, and headed out of the mall."45
Stoltzfus further testified that she tried to follow Leanne's car,
told her daughter to write down the license plate number, and
then drove home.46
During her testimony, Stoltzfus positively identified Thomas
Strickler. 47 While under cross-examination, Stoltzfus brashly
claimed that she had "an exceptionally good memory."48
Accordingly, the prosecutor "did not produce any other witnesses
to the abduction,"4 9 relying heavily on Stoltzfus's powerful
testimony. In fact, the prosecutor's closing argument at the guilt
phase "relied on Stoltzfus'[s] testimony to demonstrate
[Strickler's] violent propensities and to establish that he was the
instigator and leader in Whitlock's abduction and, by inference,
her murder."50
42 See id. at 272. Strickler began hitting Leanne on her shoulder and then




46 See id. Stoltzfus's daughter allegedly wrote the license plate number on a
three-by-four inch index card. See id. The license plate number allegedly written
down was "West Virginia NKA 243." Strickler v. Virginia, 404 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Va.
1991).
47 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 272. Stoltzfus successfully identified Strickler as
the "Mountain Man." Id.
48 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Stoltzfus further claimed: "I
had very close contact with [Strickler] and he made an emotional impression with
me [sic] because of his behavior [at the music store] and I, he caught my attention
and I paid attention. So I have absolutely no doubt of my identification." Id. at 272-
73 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 273. Stoltzfus's young daughter did not testify. See id.
60 Id. at 290. The Commonwealth of Virginia "emphasized the importance of
Stoltzfus'[s] testimony in proving the abduction." Id. The prosecutor told the jury:
"MWe are lucky enough to have an eyewitness who saw [what] happened out there
in that parking lot. [In a] lot of cases you don't. A lot of cases you can just theorize
what happened in the actual abduction. But Mrs. Stoltzfus was there, she saw
[what] happened." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
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C. The Stoltzfus Documents51
Strickler's attorneys did not become aware of the crucial
papers now known as the Stoltzfus documents until well after
Strickler was sentenced to death.52 The controversy centered on
a series of notes taken by the lead detective "during his
interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to [the
detective]." 53 The documents "cast serious doubt on Stoltzfus'[s]
confident assertion of her 'exceptionally good memory.' "54
51 See id. at 273-75.
52 See generally Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648 (Va. 1995); Strickler v.
Virginia, 404 S.E.2d 227 (Va. 1991). The case's prior history contains no mention of
the documents in question. See id. The first references to the Stoltzfius documents
were not made until the time of the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. See
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273-75.
53 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273. Stoltzfus spoke with Detective Claytor, a member
of the Harrisonburg City Police Department. See id. The Stoltzfus documents were
comprised of the following exhibits:
Exhibit 1: A handwritten note dated January 19, 1990, two weeks after the
murder, prepared by the detective, indicating that the witness "could not
identify the black female victim." Id. The sole person that the witness
"apparently could identify at this time was [Donna Kay Tudor]." Id.
Exhibit 2: A document summarizing interviews with the witness conducted
on January 19 and 20, 1990. See id. The detective noted that, at that point,
the witness "was not sure whether she could identify [Strickler and
Henderson] but felt sure she could identify [Donna Kay Tudor]." Id.
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Exhibit 3: "[A] summary of the abduction." Id. at 274.
Exhibit 4: A letter written by the witness to the detective three days after
the first interview. See id. '"he letter states that she had not remembered
being at the mall.. . ." Id. The witness wrote: "I have a very vague memory
that I'm not sure of." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted)
(emphasis added). After indicating the possibility that she saw different
individuals during the abduction, the witness lamented, "Were those 2
memories the same person?" Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Exhibit 5: A note to the detective entitled "My Impressions of The Car.'"
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The witness did not mention
"the license plate number that she vividly recalled at trial." Id.
Exhibit 6: A note from the witness to the detective dated January 25, 1990.
See id. The note indicated that, "after spending several hours with John
Dean, Whitlock's boyfriend, 'looking at current photos,' she had identified
Whitlock 'beyond a shadow of a doubt.'" Id. (citation omitted). It is
essential to point out that "by the time of trial her identification had been
expanded to include a description of [Leanne Whitlock's] clothing and her
appearance as a college kid who was 'singing' and 'happy.'" Id. (citation
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The prosecution did not know that the Stoltzfus documents
existed.55 Moreover, despite the "broader discovery provisions
afforded at trial,"56 Strickler would not have had access to the
Stoltzfus documents under Virginia law57 "except as modified by
Brady" and its progeny.58 The Commonwealth of Virginia,
however, was unaware of the Stoltzfus documents, so the
prosecutor could not comply with Brady.59 Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court charged the Commonwealth with
knowledge of the Stoltzfus documents60 in accordance with the
Court's prior decisions.61
omitted). For Anne Stoltzfus's testimonial description of Leanne Whitlock,
see supra note 39.
Exhibit 7. A letter written by the witness dated January 16, 1990. See
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 274. In the letter, the witness thanked the detective
"for his 'patience with my sometimes muddled memories.'" Id. (citation
omitted). The witness also wrote that "I never would have made any of the
associations that you helped me make." Id. (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
Exhibit 8: A piece of paper detailing what happened to the three-by-four
inch card that allegedly contained the license plate number of the victim's
car. See id. at 275. The witness wrote: "I was cleaning out my car and
found the 3x4 card. I tore it into little pieces and put it in the bottom of a
trash bag." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
64 Id. at 273.
55 During the federal habeas corpus proceedings, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia "entered a sealed, ex parte order
granting [Strickler's] counsel the right to examine and to copy all of the police
and prosecution files in the case." Id. at 278. It was this order that "led to
[defense] counsel's first examination of the Stoltzfus materials." Id.
56 Id. at 286.
57 See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(b)(2) ("This subparagraph does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or
prospective Commonwealth witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth or of reports,
memoranda or other internal Commonwealth documents made by agents in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case .... ").
68 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286. For a synthesis of the Brady doctrine, see supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
59 The "open file" policy maintained by the Commonwealth of Virginia
throughout the course of Strickler's trial was of no help. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 276 &
n.13. The open file policy only "gave [defense ]counsel access to all of the evidence in
the ... prosecutor's files," not the police files. Id. at 276.
60 "[Uinder Brady an inadvertent nondisclosure has the same impact on the
fairness of the proceedings as deliberate concealment." Id. at 288.
61 "[The action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the State... may constitute
state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment
governs any action of a State, 'whether through its legislature, through its courts, or
through its executive or administrative officers.'" Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
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While the majority assumed that the prosecution withheld
only five of the eight Stoltzfus documents, the dissent assumed
that the prosecution withheld all eight documents. 62  The
contents of the five Stoltzfus documents that both the majority
and dissent agreed were not disclosed would have been sufficient
to severely undermine the credibility of Anne Stoltzfus on the
witness stand.63 In fact, during Strickler's federal habeas corpus
proceeding, the omission of the Stoltzfus documents compelled
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to grant the writ.64 "[Tihe District Court concluded that
the failure to disclose the other five [Stoltzfus documents] was
sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confidence in the jury's
verdict."65 Strickler's attorneys appealed to the United States
Supreme Court after the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated the ruling in part.66
D. The Majority's Findings
In a majority decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed Thomas Strickler's death sentence.67 The Court first
considered the Stoltzfus documents under the Brady doctrine. 68
112-13 (1935) (citations omitted); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972) (declaring that "whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or
design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor").
62 The majority in Strickler stated that "[tihere is a dispute between the parties
over whether [the defendant's attorneys] saw Exhibits 2, 7, and 8 before trial ....
For purposes of this case, therefore, we assume that [Strickler] proceeded to trial
without having seen Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 275. For a
description of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 see supra note 53. Justice Souter's dissent,
on the other hand, assumed that defense counsel saw none of the Stoltzfus
documents before trial. See id. at 296 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting). The confusion
concerning how many documents were withheld is evident in Justice Souter's
dissent: "I understand [the Court] to have assumed that none of the eight
documents was disclosed. I proceed based on that assumption as well." Id.
63 Justice Souter noted that "[ilf one thought the difference between five and
eight documents withheld would affect the determination of prejudice, a remand to
resolve that factual question would be necessary." Id.
64 "The District Judge . . . was satisfied that the 'potentially devastating
impeachment material' contained in the other five [documents] warranted the entry
of summary judgment in [Stricklers] favor." Id. at 290 (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 279.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 296.
68 See supra notes 12-13. According to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963), "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request [by the defense] violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
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The Brady doctrine requires that the withheld evidence be
material to the case-that is, the suppression of the evidence
must undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.69
According to the Brady rule, a prosecutor violates the
"constitutional duty of disclosure" when the omission is of such
"sufficient significance [as] to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial."70
The Strickler majority declared that there are "three
components" to establishing "a true Brady violation."71 First, the
evidence in question "must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching."72 Second,
the "evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently."73  Third, "prejudice must have
ensued" as a result of the non-disclosure to the defendant.74
The majority determined that Strickler satisfied the first
two components of the Brady doctrine.75  Accordingly, the
majority concluded that the Stoltzfus documents were favorable
to Strickler, and that the Commonwealth of Virginia withheld
those documents. 76 The Court declared, however, that Strickler
prosecution." The Court later held that a formal request from defense counsel for
the disclosure of favorable evidence is unnecessary for Brady purposes. See United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
Furthermore, in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the Court
declared that "[i]mpeachment evidence... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls
within the Brady rule." The Court has found that "the prosecutor remains
responsible for gauging [the cumulative effect of all evidence suppressed by the
government] regardless of any failure by the police to bring favorable evidence to
the prosecutor's attention." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995). Under this
doctrine, "[every] prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to
the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. at
437. "[Wjhether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation... the
prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to
a material level of importance is inescapable." Id. at 437-38.
69 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ("[A] constitutional error occurs, and the
conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.").
70 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.
71 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.
72 Id. at 281-82.
73 Id. at 282; see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 296 (noting that Stricder "satisfied two of the three components of
a constitutional violation under Brady: exculpatory evidence and nondisclosure of
this evidence by the prosecution").
76 See id.
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failed to establish the final component of the Brady doctrine.77
According to the majority, Strickler did not show that there was
"a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would
have been different had [the Stoltzfus] materials been
disclosed."78 Strickler's death sentence was therefore affirmed.79
The majority admittedly believed that the Stoltzfus
documents would have indeed helped Strickler "in either the
guilt or sentencing phases of the trial."80 The majority stated
that "[without a doubt, Stoltzfus'[s] testimony was prejudicial in
the sense that it made [Strickler's] conviction more likely than if
she had not testified, and discrediting her testimony might have
changed the outcome of the trial."81 The majority, however,
concluded that this was "not the standard that [Strickler] must
satisfy in order to obtain relief." 2 Rather, Strickler needed to
convince the Court that there was a "reasonable probability"83
that "the result of the trial would have been different if the
suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense."8 4
The majority continued its exercise in legal semantics by
opining that "[t]he District Court was surely correct that there
[was] a reasonable possibility that either a total, or just a
substantial, discount of Stoltzfus'[s] testimony might have
produced a different result, either at the guilt or sentencing
phases."8 5  Sadly, since Strickler could only demonstrate a
possibility, and not a "reasonable probability" of a different
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 See id. The Court has denied Strickler's last-ditch efforts for a stay of
execution. See In re Strickler, 527 U.S. 1051 (1999).
80 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. In 1985 the Court defined "reasonable probability" to mean "a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
84 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. The majority added. "The question is not whether
the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood hs a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. .. . [Tihe question is whether the
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. at 289-90 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
85 Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
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result at the trial,86 Strickler would have to remain on death
row.
The majority justified its findings by proclaiming that even
if Stoltzfus's testimony were "entirely discredited" by the
impeaching documents, the jury could have relied on other
evidence to find that "[Strickler] was the leader of the criminal
enterprise" and still have recommended the death penalty.8 7 The
majority reached this conclusion on behalf of the jury although it
recognized the "importance of [Stoltzfus's] eyewitness
testimony," which "provided the only disinterested, narrative
account of what transpired on January 5, 1990."88 The majority
was certain that the record provided "strong support for the
conclusion that [Strickler] would have been convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death, even if Stoltzfus had been
severely impeached."89 The majority denied that Stoltzfus's
testimony impacted the sentencing phase because her testimony
"did not relate to his eligibility for the death sentence"90 and the
prosecution did not rely upon Stoltzfus's testimony "at all during
86 See supra notes 84-85.
87 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 292.
88 Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 294. The Court, however, seemed to emphasize evidence that would
have been crucial at the guilt phase of the trial, as opposed to the sentencing phase.
See id. at 292-96. The Court noted that "there was considerable forensic and other
physical evidence linking [Strickler] to the crime." Id. at 293. The majority stressed
that "the police recovered hairs on a bra and shirt found with Whitlock's body that
'were microscopically alike in all identifiable characteristics' to [Strickler's] hair."
Id. at 293 n.41 (citation omitted). Moreover, blood was found on the shirt recovered
from Strickler's mother's house, and Strickler's "fingerprints were found on the
outside and inside of the car taken from [the victim]." Id. "The weight and size of the
rock, and the character of the fatal injuries to the victim, are powerful evidence
supporting the conclusion that two people acted jointly to commit a brutal murder."
Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted).
9o Id. at 295. Justice Souter, in his dissent, proclaimed: "I could not regard
Stoltzfus's colorful testimony as anything but significant on the matter of sentence."
Id. at 303 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued:
It was Stoltzfus alone who described Strickler as the initiator of the
abduction, as the one who broke into Whitlock's car, who beckoned his
companions to follow him, and who violently subdued the victim while
"Shy Guy" sat in the back seat. The bare content of this testimony,
important enough, was enhanced by one of the inherent hallmarks of
reliability, as Stoltzfus confidently recalled detail after detail. The
withheld documents would have shown, however, that many of the details
Stoltzfus confidently mentioned on the stand.., had apparently escaped
her memory in her initial interviews with the police.
Id. at 303-04.
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its closing argument at the penalty phase."91 While admitting
that Stoltzfus was the only witness with the ability to describe
Strickler as a "violent, aggressive person,"9 2 the majority
maintained that her "portrayal surely was not as damaging" as
the other pieces of evidence before the trial jury.93
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES IMPLICATED BY THE STRICKLER DECISION
A. The Right of Effective Cross-Examination94
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant, among other things, the right
to confront his or her accusers. 95 The United States Supreme
Court has made the Sixth Amendment applicable to the
individual states96 through the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 The
91 Id. at 295. Justice Souter agreed that "the prosecution gave no prominence to
the Stoltzfus testimony" during the sentencing phase. Id. at 305 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter, however, emphasized that:
[Tihe State's closing actually did include two brief references to Strickler's
behavior in "just grabbing a complete stranger and abducting her," as
relevant to the jury's determination of future dangerousness. And since
Strickler's criminal record had no convictions involving actual violence...
the jurors may well have given weight to Stoltzfus's lively portrait of
Strickler as the aggressive leader of the group, when they came to assess
his future dangerousness.
Id. (citations omitted). For an outline of Virginia's death penalty guidelines, see
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
92 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 295.
93 Id.
94 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
testimony are tested.").
95 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). According to the Court, the
Sixth Amendment "is to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Davis, 415
U.S. at 315 (stating that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are
"secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings") (citation
omitted).
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Court has recognized that among the several rights protected by
the Sixth Amendment umbrella is "the right of an accused in a
criminal prosecution 'to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.' "98 The Court explained that "[tihe main and essential
purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination."9 9 The criminal defendant
"demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon
the witness, or of being gazed upon by [the witness], but for the
purpose of cross-examin[ing that witness]."100 The Court
proclaimed that "[cdross-examination is the principal means by
which the believability of a witness and the truth of his
testimony are tested."10' The criminal defendant has a
constitutionally protected right "to delve into the witness'[s]
story to test the witness'[s] perceptions and memory... [and] to
impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness."10 2
The criminal defendant has a per se right under the Federal
Constitution to fully cross-examine adverse witnesses.10 3 A
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are thus violated
when defense counsel is either deprived of the chance to cross-
97 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
98 Davis, 415 U.S. at 315. The Court declared that "a primary interest secured
by [the Sixth Amendment] is the right of cross-examination." Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted); see also Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4 (recognizing that
"the confrontation guarantee of the Sixth Amendment include[s] the right of cross-
examination").
"Cross examination is considered so fundamental to the adversary system of
trial that it has assumed the status of a right. Furthermore, in criminal cases, cross-
examination is a key ingredient of the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him." ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER,
EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 468-69 (West's New York
Practice Series No. 5, 1996) (footnote omitted).
99 Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
100 Id. at 316 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 318 (stating that defense counsel should have been allowed to
expose to the jury all the facts that could bear on the witness's reliability and
credibility); see also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (stating that a
defendant must be able to fully cross-examine prosecution witnesses). In Smith,
"there was not, to be sure, a complete denial of all right of cross-examination." Id.
The defendant, however, "was denied the right to ask the principal prosecution
witness" all the questions necessary to fully cross-examine that witness. Id.
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examine a witness outright, or when defense counsel is deprived
of the ability to fully and effectively cross-examine that
witness.104
The right of effective cross-examination, according to the
Court, is most important when credibility is at issue.10 5 When
the "credibility of a witness is in issue," defense counsel has a
right to "expos[e] falsehood and bring[] out the truth."10 6 "To
forbid this most rudimentary inquiry," said the Court, "is
effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself."10 7
The criminal defendant suffers prejudice "from a denial of the
opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the
weight of [the] testimony and [the witness's] credibility to a test,
without which the jury cannot fairly appraise" the witness. 08
Denying a criminal defendant the right of effective cross-
examination "would be constitutional error of the first magnitude
and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." 10 9
B. Harmless Error
In Chapman v. California,110 the United States Supreme
Court noted that "there may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic
reversal of the conviction.""' The Court was referring to the
concept of harmless constitutional error.112 The Court declared
104 See supra note 103.
105 See Smith, 390 U.S. at 131 (stating that when the witness's credibility is the
issue, the defense must be able to ask the witness's name and address).
106 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 132 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court continued:
"To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-
examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to
discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of
the safeguards essential to a fair trial. ... " Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted). There is "no obligation imposed on [a trial court] ... to protect a witness
from being discredited on cross-examination." Id. at 132-33 (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
109 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (internal quotations and citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
110 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
M Id. at 22.
112 See id. at 23-24 (explaining that all trial errors which violate the
Constitution do not automatically require reversal).
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that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
[a] court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."113
Two decades after Chapman, the Court in Rose v. Clark"4
provided further guidelines for harmless error determinations.
In Clark, the Court held that "if the defendant had counsel and
was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong
presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are
subject to harmless-error analysis."" 5 If an appellate court finds
that the trial record "establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the
judgment should be affirmed."" 6 The Court proclaimed that "the
Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a
perfect one."" 7 The Clark Court thus seems to provide license
for the widespread use of the harmless constitutional error
doctrine.
C. The Trial Jury as the Sole Trier of Fact
The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to
take the place of the jury when called upon to assess the
potential effects of disputed evidence on a trial."n In Brady v.
Maryland,"9 the defendant was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to death. 20 Unbeknownst to defense counsel, the
defendant's accomplice in the felony-murder had confessed to the
113 Id. at 24; see also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 COLUm. L. REV. 79, 80 (1988) (stating that "constitutional
error generally does not necessitate automatic reversal of a criminal conviction:
error is harmless and the conviction must be upheld when an appellate court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no impact on the ultimate
finding of guilt").
114 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
115 Id. at 579.
116 Id.
117 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
118 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317 (1974) (stating that the Court is not
willing to speculate as to whether the jury would have accepted a possible defense
theory in light of undisclosed evidence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963)
(maintaining that the Court cannot put itself in the jury's place and make
assumptions about their views).
119 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
1w See id. at84.
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actual killing.121 The prosecution had willfully suppressed the
accomplice's confession. 122 In overturning the defendant's death
sentence, the Court declined to speculate about how the
accomplice's confession could have affected the trial jury's
deliberations. 12 The Court reasoned:
We cannot put ourselves in the place of the jury and assume
what their views would have been as to whether it did or did
not matter whether it was Brady's hands or [his accomplice's]
hands that twisted the shirt about the victim's neck.... [Ilt
would be 'too dogmatic' for us to say that the jury would not
have attached any significance to this evidence in considering
the punishment of the defendant Brady.124
In Davis v. Alaska,1 defense counsel was precluded from
cross-examining a witness about his juvenile record.126 The
Court refused to theorize about how the jury would have
deliberated had defense counsel been able to expose the witness's
juvenile record: "We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as
sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted
[the defendant's] line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to
fully present it."127
Legal scholars have generally agreed with the Court's
reluctance to step into the shoes of a jury, especially a capital
jury.12 A court simply "cannot know how a jury would have
resolved questions of fact over which reasonable persons can
121 See id. "The issue in Brady involved evidence relevant only to the
determination whether defendant would receive life in prison or the death sentence
for a murder... ." Rosen, supra note 4, at 699.
12 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
123 See id. at 88.
2 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted) (second and third alterations
in original) (emphasis added).
125 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
16 See id. at 312. Defense counsel sought to call into question Richard Green's
credibility-Green provided the sole identification testimony against the defendant.
See id. at 309-10.
127 Id. at 317.
128 See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What
Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1549 (1998) (stating that "capital jurors
are not like other jurors"); Valerie P. Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The
Contributions of the Capital Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J. 1233, 1233 (1995) ("[T]here
are gaps in our knowledge of how the jury confronts the problem of deciding death.")
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original); Stacy & Dayton,
supra note 113, at 127 (stating that courts are unable to know how jurors resolve
factual issues).
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disagree."' 9 Since a trial jury's deliberations are held in secret,
the "courts have no way to determine whether [any] error [at
trial] actually influenced the jury except to rely upon [the
court's] own perceptions of the weight and credibility of the
evidence." 130 It would be impermissible for a court "to imagine
the result it would have reached had it been the trier of fact,
thereby substituting its own judgment for that of the jury."131
Courts, therefore, cannot "usurp the jury's role" as the sole trier
of fact in a case.13 2
IlI. APPLICATION TO THE STRICKLER DECISION
A. Rethinking the Stoltzfus Documents-Denial of Effective
Cross-Examination
The United States Supreme Court has declared that
"reliability is the linchpin" of identification testimony.133
Reliability includes "the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'[s] degree of
attention, the accuracy of [the] prior description of the criminal,
[and] the level of certainty demonstrated" by the witness.134 The
Commonwealth of Virginia's Brady violation'3 5 prevented the
trial jury from fully assessing the reliability of Anne Stoltzfus's
testimony. The "Brady-type misconduct" attributed to the
prosecution kept "relevant evidence away from" the trial jury.136
The Court has recognized the significance of a witness's
reliability as it relates to a trial jury's deliberations. In Napue v.
Illinois,137 the Court opined that "[t]he jury's estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence." 38 The Court correctly
stated that the jury's assessment of the reliability of a witness is
129 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 113, at 127.
130 Id. at 130.
1'1 Id. at 127.
132 Id. at 128.
133 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
14 Id.
1 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
12 Rosen, supra note 4, at 731. This is "misconduct by the representative of the
state... [and it] also calls into question the accuracy of the mechanism by which
our society deprives individuals of their freedom and their lives." Id
137 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
138 Id. at 269.
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comprised of "subtle factors" on which "a defendant's life or
liberty may depend."139 In Napue, the Court concluded that it
was "of no consequence that the falsehood [at issue in the case]
bore upon the witness'[s] credibility rather than directly upon
defendant's guilt," because "[a] lie is a lie, no matter what its
subject."140
Anne Stoltzfus lied about her "exceptionally good memory"
while testifying for the prosecution. 141 Furthermore, Stoltzfus's
infraction in Strickler is more severe than that of the witness in
Napue'42 because Stoltzfus's trial testimony had a far greater
impact on the trial jury.143 In his dissent, Justice Souter wrote:
"I believe that no other testimony comes close to the prominence
and force of Stoltzfus's account in showing Strickler as the
unquestionably dominant member of the trio involved in
Whitlock's abduction and the aggressive and moving figure
behind her murder."14 Anne Stoltzfus's testimony apparently
left a stunning impression that was significant at both the guilt
and sentencing phases of Strickler. According to Justice Souter,
Stoltzfus "was the first to describe Strickler in any detail, thus
providing the frame for the remainder of the story the
prosecution presented to the jury."145 Moreover, Stoltzfus gave
the players in the story "labels whose repetition more than a
dozen times (by the prosecutor as well as by Stoltzfus) must have
left the jurors with a clear sense of the relative roles that
Strickler and Henderson played in the crimes that followed
Stoltzfus's observation."146
Justice Souter acknowledged that "the prosecution gave no
prominence to the Stoltzfus testimony at the sentencing
stage."147 The prosecution's closing argument at the guilt phase,
however, did include references to incidents that Anne Stoltzfus
139 Id.
140 Id. at 269-70 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
141 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 272 (1999) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
143 "True, Stoltzfus'[s] testimony directly discussed only the circumstances of
Whitlock's abduction, but its impact on the jury was almost certainly broader, as the
prosecutor recognized." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 305 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 302.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 305.
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described on the witness stand.14 The prosecutor referred to
"Strickler's behavior in 'just grabbing a complete stranger and
abducting her,'" a statement that Justice Souter found "relevant
to the jury's determination of future dangerousness." 49 The
dissent thus postulates that the evidence and the prosecutor's
argument at Strickler's guilt phase had a direct impact on the
trial jury's ultimate recommendation at the sentencing phase, a
theory that is empirically supported by expert studies.150
The dissent reasoned that "since [Thomas] Strickler's
criminal record had no convictions involving actual violence...
the jurors may well have given weight to Stoltzfus's lively
portrait of Strickler as the aggressive leader of the group, when
they came to assess his future dangerousness" during the
sentencing phase.151 Justice Souter's dissent thus undertakes its
148 See id.
149 Id. (citation omitted); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text For the
relevant provisions of Virginia law governing the sentencing phases of capital
murder trials, see supra note 34.
150 See Hans supra note 128, at 1237, concluding that "[many jurors have
reached their decisions regarding whether the defendant deserves capital
punishment before the penalty phase." Furthermore, "[miost jurors have formed
strong impressions about the defendant's candidacy for death before they have even
begun the penalty phase." Id.
In another study, "[i]nterviews with 916 capital jurors in eleven states
reveal[ed] ... that many jurors reached a personal decision concerning punishment
before the sentencing stage of the trial." William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience,
and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1477 (1998). "Virtually
half of the capital jurors [surveyed] ... indicated that they thought they knew what
the punishment should be during the guilt phase of the trial." Id. at 1488. The data
show that "sizable proportions of jurors... took a stand on punishment before the
penalty stage of the trial." Id. The study "suggests that these early punishment
stands may dominate jurors' subsequent thinking about punishment and that jurors
are apt to hold tenaciously to their early punishment stands thereafter." Id. at 1490.
Most significantly, the data indicate that "many jurors seem to reach a decision
about the defendant's punishment on the basis of what they learn during the guilt
stage of the trial, rendering the evidence, the arguments, and the instructions of the
penalty phase irrelevant." Id. at 1493. Capital jurors thus tend "to give effect to the
same considerations in sentencing as in guilt." Id. (emphasis added).
151 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 305 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text. Stephen Garvey's study characterizes "future
dangerousness" of a defendant as "highly aggravating." Garvey, supra note 128, at
1559. Future dangerousness plays a "pervasive role.., in and on the minds of
capital sentencing jurors." Id. at 1560. According to the study, "[wihen the question
of the defendant's future dangerousness was put more directly-the 'defendant
might be a danger to society in the future'--57.9% [of the jurors surveyed] reported
that they would be more likely to vote for death." Id. at 1559 (footnote omitted). In
accord with Justice Souter's analysis, the jurors surveyed in the study "tended to
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own brand of judicial speculation as to what evidentiary
elements factored into the trial jury's deliberations at both
phases of the trial. Unlike the majority, however, the dissent
recognizes the dangers of reaching a decision by speculating
about the trial jury's deliberations.1 52
At the center of the uncertainty surrounding the Strickler
jury deliberations are the Stoltzfus documents. 153 The dissent
thought it clear that the Stoltzfus documents "were exculpatory
as devastating ammunition for impeaching Stoltzfus." 154 Justice
Souter urged that "the likely havoc that an informed cross-
examiner could have wreaked upon Stoltzfus [was] adequate to
raise a significant possibility of a different [sentence]
recommendation." 155 Further, the potential consequences of a
severe impeachment of Stoltzfus were also "sufficient to
undermine confidence that the death recommendation would
have been the choice."156
Justice Souter argued that, by withholding the Stoltzfus
documents, the Commonwealth of Virginia denied Thomas
Strickler his right to a full and effective cross-examination of
Anne Stoltzfus under the Sixth Amendment.157  Stoltzfus's
testimony at trial "helped establish the 'principle'... that
Strickler was 'the aggressor,' the dominant figure, in the whole
sequence of criminal events, including the murder, not just in
the abduction."158  Had defense counsel been able to call
Stoltzfus's testimony into question using the Stoltzfus
documents, "the jurors' belief that Strickler was the chief
aggressor might have been undermined to the point that at least
one of them would have hesitated to recommend death."159 The
attach little mitigating weight to the absence of any previous criminal history." Id.
at 1560. "In short, while future dangerousness is highly aggravating, lack of future
dangerousness is only moderately mitigating." Id.
152 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 307 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that since
"[olne cannot be reasonably confident that not a single juror would have had a
different perspective" the proper solution is to "vacate the sentence and remand for
reconsideration").
163 For a comprehensive inventory of the Stoltzfus documents, see supra
note 53.
154 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 304.
156 Id.
157 See supra notes 98-99, 103-04 and accompanying text.
158 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 306 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159 Id.
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dissent sharply noted that "[all it would have taken, after all,
was one juror to hold out against death to preclude the
recommendation actually given."160 Although the dissent indeed
speculated about the potential effects of Anne Stoltzfus's
impeachment on the trial jury's deliberations, Justice Souter,
unlike the majority, was not willing to let his speculative
conclusions dispose of the issue. Instead, in the interests of
justice, the dissent would have opted for the proper solution in a
close case such as Strickler-Justice Souter would have
"vacate[d] the sentence and remand[ed] for reconsideration" the
question of whether Thomas Strickler should be put to death.161
Additionally, Justice Souter correctly concluded that had the
Stoltzfus documents been a part of Strickler's trial, there would
have been lingering doubt 162 whether Strickler deserved the
death penalty recommendation. Justice Souter reasoned that
the jurors could well have had little certainty about who had
been in charge [of the crime]. But they could have had no doubt
about the leader if they believed Stoltzfus.... One cannot be
reasonably confident that not a single juror would have had a
different perspective after an impeachment that would have
destroyed the credibility of that story.163
160 Id. at 304.
161 Id. at 307.
16 See Bowers et al., supra note 150, at 1533. "The heaviest counterweight to
[the capital juror's early preference for a recommendation of death] is a nagging
concern or lingering doubt.., about the defendant's guilt of capital murder." Id.
(emphasis added). Such "lingering doubt crystallizes into a pro-life stand for many
[capital jurors] during the guilt phase of the trial; it becomes an affirmative
commitment to life [imprisonment] as the appropriate punishment." Id. (emphasis
added). The life sentence recommendation "is a moral response to remaining doubts
they have about the evidence of guilt, sufficient, they often reluctantly agree, for a
capital murder verdict, but not for a death sentence." Id. (emphasis added).
Lingering doubt "is the strongest influence in support of a final life punishment
vote." Id. at 1536. Furthermore, when lingering doubt is present, the data indicate
that it "is an integral element in forming a reasoned moral judgment about
punishment." Id.
The Garvey study refers to this doctrine as "[rlesidual doubt." Garvey, supra
note 128, at 1563. According to this study, "the best thing a capital defendant can do
to improve his chances of receiving a life sentence ... is to raise doubt about his
guilt." Id. (footnote omitted). The surveyed jurors reported that "if they had
lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt, 60.4% said they would be much less
likely to impose death, and 77.2% said they would be at least slightly less likely [to
recommend death]." Id.
16 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 307 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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As the Strickler majority demonstrated, "[tihe [United
States] Supreme Court so far has failed to grant or to recognize
the place of lingering doubt as an essential ingredient of a
reasoned moral judgment" in capital cases. 164
B. Rethinking the Stoltzfus Documents-Harmless Error?
Having demonstrated that Thomas Strickler's right to a full
and effective cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment was
violated at trial,165 and that the withholding of the Stoltzfus
documents would have provided lingering doubt over the trial
jury's sentencing phase deliberations, 166 can it be said that the
withholding of the Stoltzfus documents was harmless
constitutional error?167 Recall that in order for a constitutional
error to qualify as "harmless," the error must be "so unimportant
and insignificant that [it] may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless." 168 The harmless error rule
calls for a reviewing court to determine, beyond a reasonable
doubt, 169 "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to" the result of
the trial.170 The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated
its preference for the use of the harmless error doctrine. 171 The
current Rehnquist Court, especially, has been criticized for its
"increasingly widespread use of the doctrine of harmless
constitutional error."172
A Brady infraction that ultimately leads to a Sixth
Amendment violation, as well as lingering doubt over a trial
jury's recommendation of the death penalty, cannot simply be
deemed harmless constitutional error. The Court had previously
labeled the deprivation of the right of effective cross-examination
under the Sixth Amendment as a "constitutional error of the first
magnitude," with "no amount of showing of want of prejudice"
164 Bowers et al., supra note 150, at 1546.
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
167 See supra Part II.B.
168 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
169 See id. at 24.
170 Id. at 23 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
171 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
172 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 113, at 79.
[Vol.74:509
2000] LEGAL SEMANTICS AND JUDICIAL SPECULATION
being able to cure it.173 Moreover, the Court has historically
been unwilling to put itself "in the place of the jury and assume
what their views would have been" in light of disputed
evidence. 7 4 Consequently, the majority's conclusions regarding
the Stoltzfus documents, which, in effect, declared the non-
disclosure to be harmless constitutional error, are wholly
inconsistent with the past jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court.175
C. Legal Semantics Gymnastics
The majority held that Thomas Strickler failed to show that
there was "a reasonable probability that his conviction or
sentence would have been different had [the Stoltzfus] materials
been disclosed."176 "[Slurely," the majority wrote, there was "a
reasonable possibility that either a total, or just a substantial,
discount of Stoltzfus'[s] testimony might have produced a
different result, either at the guilt or sentencing phases," but
this showing was not enough to warrant a new sentencing phase
for Strickler.177 Swinging on the vines of the legal semantics
jungle, the majority has perhaps doomed the Strickler opinion to
a tormented existence in the annals of legal commentary.
Justice Souter's dissent referred to the "reasonable
probability" standard as "familiarly deceptive."178 According to
Justice Souter, "the continued use of the term 'probability' raises
an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as akin
to the more demanding standard, 'more likely than not.' "179 Like
the majority, the dissenting opinion was admittedly persuaded
that Strickler "failed to establish a reasonable probability that,
had the materials withheld been disclosed, he would not have
173 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
174 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see also supra Part 11. (discussing the Court's hesitancy to speculate
about the trial jury's deliberations).
175 For the complete evidentiary findings of the Strickler majority, see supra
Part LD.
176 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) (emphasis added).
177 Id. at 291.
'17 Id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 298. Justice Souter went on to propose an alternative standard-a
"significant possibility" standard-that "would do better at capturing the degree to
which the undisclosed evidence would place the actual result in question, sufficient
to warrant overturning a conviction or sentence." Id
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been found guilty of capital murder." °80 Justice Souter, however,
believed that there was "a reasonable probability.., that
disclosure of the Stoltzfus materials would have led the jury to
recommend life, not death."181 For the dissent, "the touchstone of
the enquiry must remain whether the evidentiary suppression
'undermines our confidence' that the factfinder would have
reached the same result."18 2
The "reasonable probability" standard has also come under
attack by legal experts who have conducted exhaustive studies
on capital juries. 83 It has been argued that the "reasonable
probability" standard "interfere[s] with a jury's prerogatives."1' 4
That is, appellate courts that seek to determine the potential
effects of disputed evidence on a trial jury "usurp[] the jury's
constitutional prerogatives" as the sole triers of fact in a case.185
The "reasonable probability" standard "would be unobjectionable
[only] if courts had information that would allow them to draw
reliable inferences about how a particular jury resolved disputes
about the weight and credibility of the evidence" at issue.18 6
Unfortunately, "[blecause the jury's deliberations are secret,
courts have no way to determine whether the error [at trial]
actually influenced the jury except to rely upon their own
perceptions of the weight and credibility of the evidence." 87
Finally, the Strickler majority is guilty of ignoring
precedent. The harmless constitutional error rule announced in
Chapman succinctly framed the inquiry as "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to" produce a different result. 88 Having found
that there was "surely" a "reasonable possibility" that the
Stoltzfus documents "might have produced a different result,
either at the guilt or sentencing phases,"18 9 it was inconceivable
180 Id. at 297. The dissent's view here is in accord with the overwhelming
forensic evidence that was recovered which tended to implicate Strickler beyond a
reasonable doubt. See supra note 89.
181 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 300-01.
183 See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 113, at 127.
184 Id. at 128.
185 Id. at 127.
186 Id. at 129.
187 Id. at 129-30 (emphasis added).
188 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (internal quotations and
citation omitted) (emphasis added).
189 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 291 (1999) (emphasis added).
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for the Strickler majority to hold that Thomas Strickler failed to
demonstrate that prejudice ensued from the Commonwealth's
Brady violation. The majority's approach to Thomas Strickler's
burden of proof was undeniably inconsistent with the standard
announced in Chapman.
Under the combined analyses above, there are compelling
grounds strongly mitigating against affirming Strickler's death
sentence. It was erroneous for the majority to conclude that
confidence in the result at the Strickler sentencing phase was
not undermined beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the
majority erred in denying a new sentencing phase for Thomas
Strickler.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court clearly erred when it
denied Thomas Strickler a new sentencing phase and affirmed
his death sentence. The Constitution, the Court's own case law,
and expert studies of capital juries all vehemently denounce
attempts by a court of law to substitute its own views for that of
the trial jury. In Strickler, the majority brazenly spoke for the
trial jury and came to speculative conclusions of fact on behalf of
the Strickler jurors. Unless the majority possessed transcripts of
the trial jury's deliberations during the Strickler sentencing
phase, the Court could not have possibly concluded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the non-disclosure of the Stoltzfus
documents did not prejudice Thomas Strickler. The prophetic
words of Sun-tzu seem to ring true in light of the majority's
erroneous decision in Strickler. Sun-tzu warned, "[f]or, those
enraged may be happy again, and those infuriated may be
cheerful again, but annihilated countries may never exist again,
nor may the dead ever live again."'9 °
19D SUN-TZU, supra note 1, at 110 (emphasis added).
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